


# CS449/649: Human-Computer Interaction

Spring 2019

Lecture IX


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Anastasia Kuzminykh and Edward Lank






## Translating Needs Into Functionalities






## Translating Needs Into Functionalities





## Translating Needs Into Functionalities





## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

First Name  
Last Name  
Year, Vol. No. 1, 123-127

### The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

Jonathan S. B. T. Evans

University of Plymouth, Plymouth, England

An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of experimental thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning is influenced and facilitated by the structure of cognitive control systems that are generated and in a small, relatively unexplored, by the context. The theory is presented as a heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, and is evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its predictive power. The theory is presented as a heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, and is evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its predictive power. The theory is presented as a heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, and is evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its predictive power.

In recent years, a number of researchers in the psychology of thinking and reasoning have advanced dual-process theories of reasoning (Evans, 1975). These have suggested that people's behavior reflects the operation of two distinct thinking systems. However, these theories have been criticized for being too narrow, for not being able to account for a wide range of reasoning phenomena, and for not being able to account for the role of context in reasoning. The theory presented here is a heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, and is evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its predictive power. The theory is presented as a heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning, and is evaluated in terms of its explanatory power and its predictive power.

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Advances in Experimental Social Psychology  
Volume 19, 1986, Pages 123-205



### The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion

Richard E. Petty


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#### Publisher Summary

This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research.



The intuition-reasoning theory,  
Daniel Kahneman,  
2003

Personality and Social Psychology Review  
2004, Vol. 8, No. 1, 126-127

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Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

### Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior

Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch

University of Würzburg

University of Würzburg

The article describes a 2-component model of cognition and behavior. It is based on a dual-process theory of cognition and behavior. The first component is the reflective system, which is characterized by conscious, deliberate, and controlled processes. The second component is the impulsive system, which is characterized by automatic, unconscious, and uncontrolled processes. The two systems interact to determine social behavior. The reflective system is responsible for the conscious, deliberate, and controlled aspects of social behavior. The impulsive system is responsible for the automatic, unconscious, and uncontrolled aspects of social behavior.

In the history of attempts to describe the causes of human behavior, the most influential explanation has been the cognitive-behavioral model. This model is based on the assumption that human beings do what they think, feel, and believe. This model is based on the assumption that human beings do what they think, feel, and believe. This model is based on the assumption that human beings do what they think, feel, and believe.

Although many psychologists have been trained in the cognitive-behavioral model, there have been a number of researchers who have been interested in the automatic, unconscious, and uncontrolled aspects of human behavior. These researchers have been interested in the automatic, unconscious, and uncontrolled aspects of human behavior. These researchers have been interested in the automatic, unconscious, and uncontrolled aspects of human behavior.

The heuristic-analytic  
theory of reasoning,  
Jonathan S. B. T. Evans, 1975

The elaboration likelihood model,  
Richard E. Petty, John Cacioppo,  
1986

The reflective and impulsive  
determinants theory,  
Fritz Strack, Roland Deutsch, 2004



## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

**Turn problems  
into tasks**

**Thinking**

Memory

Attention

Motivations


Habituation

**Dual process theory**

**Cognitive load**




## Translating Needs Into Functionalities








## Translating Needs Into Functionalities






## Translating Needs Into Functionalities





## Translating Needs Into Functionalities





## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

**Turn problems  
into tasks**

**Thinking**

Memory

Attention

Motivations

Habituation

**Dual process theory**

**Cognitive load**

**Anticipate mistakes**

(should be easy to undo, avoid error-prompt tasks)



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**Cognitive load**

**Anticipate mistakes**

(should be easy to undo, avoid error-prompt tasks)

**Perception biases**

(expectations determine perception)



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**Dual process theory**

**Cognitive load**

**Anticipate mistakes**

(should be easy to undo, avoid error-prompt tasks)

**Perception biases**

(expectations determine perception)

**Age, socioeconomic status, cognitive  
abilities influence decision making**



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**Turn problems  
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Thinking

**Memory**

Attention

Motivations

Habituation

**Perception - storage - retrieval**



## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

**Turn problems  
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Thinking

**Memory**

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**Perception - storage - retrieval**

**Recognition rather than recall**





## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

**Turn problems  
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**Memory**

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**Perception - storage - retrieval**

**Recognition rather than recall**

**People can remember ~3-4 items at a  
time.**



## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

Turn problems  
into tasks

Thinking

**Memory**

Attention

Motivations

Habituation

Perception - storage - retrieval

Recognition rather than recall

People can remember ~3-4 items at a time.

**Zeigarnik effect - interrupted tasks are easier to remember** (depends on the importance of the interrupted task for the person)



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Turn problems  
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Thinking

Memory

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Motivations

Habituatation

Focused attention is limited and  
selective



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Focused attention is limited and  
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Inattentional blindness



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Turn problems  
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Focused attention is limited and  
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Inattentional blindness

**Surface** (awareness of features) **and**  
**content attention** (awareness of  
information)



## Translating Needs Into Functionalities

**Turn problems  
into tasks**

Thinking

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**Attention**

Motivations

Habituation

**Focused attention is limited and selective**

**Inattentional blindness**

**Surface** (awareness of features) **and content attention** (awareness of information)

**Attention is dynamic - allow hierarchy**